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a b s t r a c t 
We explore how individual risk perception inﬂuences prices and trading behavior in a market setting. 
Speciﬁcally, our study lets experimental participants trade assets characterized by varying shapes of re- 
turn distributions. While common mean-variance models predict identical prices for most of our assets, 
we ﬁnd trading prices to differ signiﬁcantly. Assets that are perceived as being less risky on average (de- 
spite having identical volatility) trade at signiﬁcantly higher prices. Individually, traders who perceive a 
certain asset to be less risky are also net buyers on average. With regard to different risk measures, our 
results show that the probability of a loss is the strongest predictor of transaction prices and risk per- 
ception. All these results hold also for experienced traders and when traders can trade two assets at the 
same time. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction 
Building on a growing body of literature showing that individ- 
ual risk perception is often driven by factors other than volatility, 
we are the ﬁrst to explore whether and how risk perception in- 
ﬂuences prices and trading behavior in markets. In particular we 
test whether risk measures, such as volatility of returns, or rather 
subjectively perceived risk, drives asset prices; and if the driver is 
risk perception, to what extent and in what way it affects market 
prices. 
Would, for example, a guarantee product that promises to pay 
back at least the amount invested, trade at a premium com- 
pared to other products with the same return volatility and ex- 
pected return, because investors perceived it to be less risky? This 
would be a ﬁnding not covered by prominent ﬁnance models like 
Markowitz ’ (1952) ) portfolio theory or the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) , 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) , where expected return, volatility 
of returns and the covariance of different assets are assumed to be 
the factors driving prices of risky assets. 
Several studies in the judgment and decision making domain 
explore drivers of risk perception, mostly using complex gambles 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: juergen.huber@uibk.ac.at (J. Huber), stefan.palan@uni-graz.at 
(S. Palan), s.zeisberger@fm.ru.nl (S. Zeisberger). 
( Brachinger and Weber, 1997; Keller et al., 1986; Klos et al., 2005 ; 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2008; Zeisberger, 2016 ) or theoretical 
models ( Diecidue and Van De Ven, 2008 ). However, several au- 
thors suggest that risk perception and thus, by extension, risk- 
taking, is domain-speciﬁc and that settings where ﬁnancial alter- 
natives are framed as gambles may lead to different results regard- 
ing risk-taking behavior than settings where ﬁnancial alternatives 
are framed as investment decisions. (see, e.g., Rettinger and Hastie, 
2001; Weber et al., 2002; 2005; Baucells and Rata, 2006; Nosi ´c and 
Weber, 2010; Weber et al., 2013 ). This implies that a pure gambling 
task is unlikely to be perceived in the same way as a (more com- 
plex) investment task and that results from the former may not 
hold for the latter. 
Recent studies have thus studied more directly whether the 
most commonly used risk measure, volatility (usually expressed as 
the standard deviation of returns), is what investors, investment 
advisors and ﬁnancial practitioners apply intuitively when evalu- 
ating risky assets. Nosi ´c and Weber (2010) , Weber et al. (2013) , 
Bradbury et al. (2015) and Merkle (2018) demonstrate that volatil- 
ity often plays only a minor role for risk perception and allo- 
cation decisions. 1 In papers using a similar design to our own, 
1 Ehm et al. (2018) outline possibilities to at least partially overcome the ne- 
glect of volatility in investment decisions. Earlier studies on investor risk percep- 
tion include MacGregor et al. (1999) , who ask ﬁnancial experts to rate the riskiness 
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Zeisberger (2018) and Holzmeister et al. (2019) let experimental 
subjects assess the riskiness of various return distributions. Both 
papers provide direct evidence that investors evaluate the risk in- 
herent in asset return distributions mostly according to the proba- 
bility of incurring a loss. 
However, all of the results presented above are obtained at the 
individual as opposed to at the market level. In behavioral ﬁnance 
there is an ongoing debate about whether individual biases and 
preferences are relevant for market prices or whether arbitrage 
prevents them from having an effect (see, e.g., Gode and Sun- 
der, 1993; Coval and Shumway, 2005; Barber et al., 2008; Shefrin, 
2008; Heemeijer et al., 2009; Hommes, 2011; Hirshleifer, 2015 ). 
The transferability of individual results to market outcomes and 
to trading behavior in a market setting is not necessarily straight- 
forward. The most common line of argument is that individual 
biases will usually cancel out, and even if not, that a few per- 
ceptive investors will drive prices to fundamentals. Yet Levy and 
Levy (2009) reach a different conclusion. They theoretically explore 
how asset prices and asset allocations would be affected by in- 
vestors having non-standard preferences. Investors in their model 
follow a safety-ﬁrst approach (originally proposed by Roy, 1952 ), 
which is equivalent to an explicit aversion against the probability 
of experiencing a loss. Levy and Levy ’s model yields asset alloca- 
tions and market prices which differ from standard ﬁnance mod- 
els. However, the heterogeneity across investors in risk perceptions 
and preferences makes it diﬃcult to infer market predictions from 
results gained at the individual level. 2 
Against this background we are the ﬁrst to directly test whether 
investor risk perception elicited at the individual level also plays 
a role in a market setting, in which prices are the result of de- 
mand and supply. In particular, we conduct laboratory experiments 
in which we present participants with different asset return dis- 
tributions. This controlled setting allows us to hold mean return 
constant but vary a number of other characteristics across the dis- 
tributions. This variation may induce differences in risk percep- 
tion across assets between individuals. We let experimental sub- 
jects trade these assets in a continuous double auction market. Our 
setup allows us to compare market prices across assets. We are 
furthermore able to analyze to what extent individually-stated risk 
perception predicts market prices and individual trading behavior 
in markets. We thus aim to contribute to resolving the ongoing de- 
bate about whether and to what extent individual preferences, bi- 
ases and perceptions inﬂuence market prices and trading behavior. 
We ﬁnd that individual risk perceptions indeed predict prices 
in asset markets: assets with higher average perceived riskiness 
are traded at signiﬁcantly lower prices. We furthermore ﬁnd that 
individually elicited risk perception also predicts traders’ behav- 
ior in markets. Participants who state a comparatively low per- 
ceived riskiness for a given asset are more likely to be net buyers 
than are traders who state a comparatively high perceived riski- 
ness, even though prices already reﬂect differences in perceived 
riskiness. Our ﬁndings are robust to analyzing different subsets of 
our data. The results also hold for experienced traders and when 
of various general investment categories and document a substantial heterogene- 
ity of different notions of risk, Koonce et al. (2005) , who ﬁnd that decision the- 
ory and behavioral variables both directly inﬂuence investors’ risk assessments, and 
Unser (20 0 0) , who presents participants with hypothetical future price distributions 
of different stocks and observes that for future returns and a variable hypothetical 
holding period, risk is perceived mainly as the length of time a stock price remains 
below a previous reference point. 
2 Related to our research question, experimental papers have examined 
portfolio choice and the empirical reliability of mean-variance frameworks. 
Ackert et al. (2016) for example ﬁnd that in a setting where optimality is relatively 
easy to detect, individuals are much more likely to make decisions accordingly, and 
Kroll et al. (1988) ﬁnd substantial ineﬃcient choice behavior in a portfolio selection 
task. 
traders can trade two assets at the same time. With regard to the 
underlying driver of risk perception, we ﬁnd the probability of in- 
curring a loss, rather than more common risk measures, to ex- 
plain 95 percent of the variation in perceived riskiness at the asset 
level. This in turn explains 94 percent of the variation in average 
trading prices in our markets. As Zeisberger (2016, 2018) show, it 
is important to distinguish between the expected loss , the magni- 
tude of a loss and the probability of a loss . Neither the ﬁndings in 
Zeisberger (2018) nor our own can be explained by investors’ loss 
aversion. Our results are thus distinct from the well-known ﬁnd- 
ings of, e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (1995) for asset allocations and 
Barberis et al. (2001) or Ang et al. (2005) for asset prices. 
2. Design and implementation of the experiment 
2.1. General aim and procedure 
We ran laboratory experiments to test whether risk percep- 
tion affects market prices and trading behavior in experimental 
asset markets. The experiment started by the experimenter read- 
ing out loud, and the subjects following along on their own paper 
copies, general information about the experiment and speciﬁc in- 
structions regarding the trading mechanism. This was followed by 
a trial trading period to train participants in operating the trad- 
ing interface. Next, the experimenter read out loud, and the sub- 
jects followed along on their own paper copies, the instructions 
regarding the endowments, the assets to be traded, and the pay- 
out function. Then followed the main part of the experiment, in 
which different assets were traded one after the other (described 
in detail below). A questionnaire with socio-demographic items, 
risk- and loss-preference elicitation and ﬁnancial literacy questions 
concluded the experiment. Subjects were then paid, in private and 
in cash, and left. 
In the main part of the experiment we use eight different as- 
sets, each with a distinct return distribution (see Fig. 1 and the 
next subsection). Participants assess the risk of the ﬁrst asset on 
a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 for lowest to 7 for highest per- 
ceived riskiness). After this assessment, ﬁxed groups of eight sub- 
jects trade the asset for three minutes. After trading, participants 
move on to the second asset, assess its risk, followed by a trading 
round, etc., until the eighth asset. We elicit individuals’ risk per- 
ceptions for each asset before trading since we do not want the 
perception data to be contaminated by the experience in the mar- 
kets and since Zeisberger (2018) shows that asking for risk percep- 
tion itself does not systematically inﬂuence the willingness to in- 
vest at the individual level in a way that would distort our market- 
level analyses. 
2.2. Asset return distributions 
To shed some light on the potential drivers of risk perception, 
our assets differ in terms of kurtosis, probability of incurring a loss, 
expected loss and skewness, as well as minimum and maximum 
return. Here we follow the design of Zeisberger (2018) , and seven 
of our eight assets are also present in his study (he uses ten as- 
sets, of which we discard three which closely resemble others and 
which therefore are not suited for our purpose of inducing vary- 
ing levels of perceived riskiness). The one additional asset we de- 
signed is asset KURTOSIS, which is leptocurtic, i.e., it is character- 
ized by an excess kurtosis of 4.56. All distributions are depicted 
in Fig. 1 and their properties and main characteristics are outlined 
in Table 1 . One main reason for following Zeisberger’s approach is 
that he documents strong differences in risk perception, which is 
a necessary condition for ﬁnding any potential differences at the 
market level. 
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Fig. 1. Return distributions of the eight assets used in the experiment. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the eight distributions used in the experiment. PLoss stands for the probability of incurring a loss and ELoss 
for the expected loss. 
Distribution Mean StdDev Semivar PLoss ELoss Skewness Kurtosis MinReturn MaxReturn 
NORMAL 0.082 0.181 0.178 0.370 −0.038 0.002 −0.024 −0.360 0.550 
NegSKEWNESS 0.082 0.178 0.280 0.200 −0.051 −1.256 0.098 −0.350 0.240 
PosSKEWNESS 0.082 0.178 0.109 0.500 −0.021 1.276 0.204 −0.060 0.540 
BigLOSS 0.084 0.182 0.185 0.280 −0.031 −0.985 5.442 −0.850 0.500 
WIDER 0.080 0.313 0.306 0.370 −0.089 0.002 −0.527 −0.550 0.750 
FrequentLOSS 0.080 0.184 0.108 0.700 −0.020 1.294 −0.171 −0.050 0.460 
NoLOSS 0.079 0.179 0.063 0.000 0.000 3.266 10.544 0.000 0.990 
KURTOSIS 0.081 0.182 0.178 0.340 −0.032 −0.729 4.561 −0.740 0.660 
Our eight different return distributions are selected such that, 
relative to the nominal buyback value (BBV) of 100, each has a 
mean return of close to 8 percent. This fact was clearly communi- 
cated to our participants three times in the instructions. All other 
characteristics of the assets’ return distributions were only com- 
municated graphically, such that subjects who wanted to condition 
their decisions on, e.g., risk measures like variance or kurtosis, had 
to estimate these from the histogram of returns. 
Importantly, the standard deviation of seven of the eight assets 
is approximately 18 percent, hence potential differences between 
trading prices of these seven assets cannot come from differences 
in this canonical risk measure. Only asset WIDER is designed to 
have a higher standard deviation of 31 percent. This allows us to 
study the effect of a variation in volatility on risk perception. Asset 
NORMAL is approximately normally distributed. Asset NegSKEW- 
NESS displays highly negative skewness of −1.256, PosSKEWNESS 
highly positive skewness of +1.276. Asset BigLOSS stands out with 
the possibility of losing up to 85 percent. Asset FrequentLOSS is 
characterized by 70 percent of cases leading to (moderate) losses, 
while asset NoLOSS never incurs losses (but also offers only small 
gains). Finally, asset KURTOSIS has excess kurtosis of 4.56. 
2.3. Trading environment 
The trading environment uses a continuous double auction 
mechanism with open order book. 3 Participants can submit any 
combination of limit and/or market orders. The order book is emp- 
tied before the beginning of each period and provides information 
about prices and quantities of outstanding orders. Unexecuted limit 
orders can be canceled without cost and at any time, and orders 
are executed according to price, followed by time, priority. Shorting 
stocks and borrowing money is not possible. No interest is paid on 
taler (experimental currency) holdings and there are no transaction 
costs. Assets live for a single period and are bought back by the ex- 
perimenter after market closing at the buyback value (BBV), which 
is the same for all traders. There are no other cash ﬂows originat- 
ing from assets. The BBV consists of the nominal buyback value 
of 100 ± a return drawn from the respective asset’s known re- 
turn distribution with a mean of close to 8 percent (see Fig. 1 and 
Table 1 ). Hence, the expected payoff (and risk-neutral BBV) of each 
asset is 108 (rounded). 
Each trader starts the experiment with an endowment of 5 as- 
sets and 800 taler. Cash and asset holdings are reset to these val- 
ues at the beginning of each subsequent period. The ratio of out- 
standing talers to the value of outstanding assets, commonly re- 
ferred to as the cash-to-asset ratio, thus is 1.48 in all periods. This 
ensures that traders are able to make transactions at reasonable 
frequencies and prices but it is also reasonably low to avoid bias- 
ing our results by cash endowment effects (see Kirchler et al., 2012, 
3 See the online appendix for the experimental instructions and screenshots of 
the trading environment. 
Noussair and Tucker, 2016 and the references therein for evidence 
on the effect of cash endowments on mispricing). 
2.4. Questionnaire and payment 
After subjects have concluded risk assessment and trading of 
the eight assets, we ask them to answer the ﬁnancial literacy ques- 
tions 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, and 16 of van Rooij et al. (2011) . Following 
this step, subjects ﬁll in a questionnaire eliciting their gender, age, 
nationality, employment status, major and type of study program. 
The questionnaire then asks the general and ﬁnancial risk prefer- 
ence questions of Dohmen et al. (2011) and patience and loss pref- 
erence questions modelled after the general risk preference ques- 
tion. 4 
Traders’ payoffs in the experiment are based on their wealth 
( W p,T ) determined at the end (time T ) of a period ( p ), with as- 
set holdings evaluated at the realized BBV. To avoid diversiﬁca- 
tion effects over the eight periods, the experimenter rolls an eight- 
sided die after the ﬁnal period to determine one period that is to 
be payoff-relevant for all traders in the session. All this is public 
knowledge. Given this incentive scheme and the zero-sum nature 
of the design, an inactive trader’s period earnings depend only on 
the realization of BBV. At the expected value of 108 taler per as- 
set, traders earn 5 · 108 + 800 = 1340 taler, or € 13.40 on average 
from the trading phase (for subjects’ payoffs at the end of the ex- 
periment, 100 taler equal € 1.00). Finally, the computer randomly 
chooses one of the ﬁnancial literacy questions and subjects earn an 
additional € 1.00 if their answer on this question was correct. 
2.5. Robustness experiments 
To further explore the stability of our ﬁndings, we report on 
classroom sessions of a treatment we will title RETURN and on 
two other robustness check treatments labelled EXPERIENCE and 
TWO-MARKETS. 5 In treatment RETURN, instead of asking subjects 
to answer the question “How risky do you perceive this secu- 
rity to be?” we ask “How attractive do you perceive the returns 
of this security to be?”. In treatment EXPERIENCE we let sub- 
jects trade each asset for three consecutive periods and we do 
not elicit subjects’ risk perceptions. We furthermore limit the set 
of assets to NoLOSS and FrequentLOSS, as these were the as- 
sets with the lowest and, respectively, highest, perceived riskiness. 
In treatment TWO-MARKETS, subjects trade the assets NoLOSS 
and FrequentLOSS simultaneously – one in the upper half of the 
screen, the other in the lower half. They do so for three peri- 
ods. The three extra treatments are described in more detail in 
Sections 3.4.2 through 3.4.4 . 
4 All of these questions use a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 10 as in, for example, 
0 or “Not at all willing to take risks” to 10 or “Very willing to take risks”. 
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these latter two treatments. 
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2.6. Experimental organization 
We conducted the experiment at the Innsbruck EconLab in Jan- 
uary 2017 (main experiment) and May 2019 (treatments EXPERI- 
ENCE and TWO-MARKETS) and at the MaxJungLab Graz in April 
2017 and 2018 (treatment RETURN). For each session in Innsbruck 
we recruited 24 subjects with hroot ( Bock et al., 2014 ) from a stan- 
dard student subjects pool, for a total of 264 subjects. For each 
of the ﬁve sessions in Graz we recruited between 5 and 11 (aver- 
age 8.6) subjects in a PhD-level class Experimental Methods , for a 
total of 43 subjects. In each session of the main experiment and 
of treatment EXPERIENCE we ran three parallel batches with eight 
subjects each forming one market. In the ﬁve sessions of treat- 
ment RETURN, between ﬁve and eleven subjects formed one mar- 
ket. In robustness check treatment TWO-MARKETS, twelve subjects 
formed one market. Hence, each of our assets in the main experi- 
ment was traded in 12 separate markets, in RETURN in 5 markets, 
in EXPERIENCE in 9 markets and in TWO-MARKETS in 10 markets. 
The software was implemented using GIMS v7.4.11 ( Palan, 2015 ) in 
z-Tree v3.6.7 ( Fischbacher, 2007 ). The experimental sessions lasted 
between 45 and 60 min and the average payment was € 13.60 per 
subject in the main experiment, € 13.98 in RETURN, € 12.19 in EX- 
PERIENCE and € 13.13 in TWO-MARKETS. 
3. Results 
We start by presenting results on individual risk perception and 
then turn to market prices and trading volume. Finally, we explore 
the drivers of individual trading behavior in our markets. The data 
analysis was conducted in R v3.5.1 ( R Core Team, 2018 ), using the 
z-Tree import script described in Kirchkamp (2019) and the table 
output of Leifeld (2013) . 
3.1. Individual risk assessment 
In each period, before trading started, subjects ﬁrst had to in- 
dividually assess the perceived riskiness of the asset on a 7-point 
Likert scale, as in Zeisberger (2018) . 6 As seven of our eight assets 
are also in the sample of Zeisberger ’s study, this task can be seen 
as a replication of this part of his work. The main ﬁnding in his 
paper is that the “probability of losing” is the most important de- 
terminant of what people perceive as risk, and our results clearly 
conﬁrm this. As Fig. 2 and Table 2 show, “probability of a loss” is 
the only variable signiﬁcantly driving risk perception in our experi- 
ment. Each of the seven panels of Fig. 2 shows one of seven poten- 
tial risk drivers on the horizontal axis and average risk perception 
(across all 96 subjects) on the vertical axis. While most of the po- 
tential risk drivers show no clear pattern, the “probability of a loss”
stands out with a clear upward trend. The higher the probability 
of experiencing a loss, the higher the perceived riskiness of the as- 
set. With an R 2 of 0.958 the linear trend is a very good ﬁt for the 
data. While this analysis is conducted only at the aggregate level, 
individual data regressions conﬁrm these ﬁndings (see below for 
details). 7 In Fig. 2 , kurtosis also seems to be a driver of perceived 
risk. However, this is mostly due to the fact that the asset with 
6 Despite their atheoretical nature, Likert scales are frequently used in assessing 
(investor) risk perception; see, for example, Nosi ´c and Weber (2010) and Weber 
et al. (20 02, 20 05) . Alternative measures, such as estimating return volatility, re- 
quire a higher level of statistical understanding and might not capture what (retail) 
investors think of as riskiness. 
7 Figs. A.4 and A.5 in the appendix present the same data without averaging 
across subjects, once for all periods and once excluding data from the ﬁrst period. 
While the individual period data is of course more noisy, the relationship between 
the probability of a loss and the perceived riskiness is still very strong ( R 2 = 0 . 77 
in both ﬁgures). 
Table 2 
Regressions of RiskPerception (per trader and asset) on distribution char- 
acteristics. StdDev stands for standard deviation, PLoss for probability of a 
loss, ELoss for expected loss in case of a loss, and MinReturn for the mini- 
mum return possible. 
OLS Subject ﬁxed effects 
Intercept 4.783 ∗∗
(2.063) 
StdDev −19.017 −19.017 
(16.393) (16.233) 
Semivar −10.520 −10.520 
(19.113) (18.927) 
PLoss 5.434 ∗∗∗ 5.434 ∗∗∗
(1.453) (1.438) 
ELoss −75.537 −75.537 
(66.911) (66.258) 
Skewness 0.097 0.097 
(1.008) (0.998) 
Kurtosis 0.049 0.049 
(0.204) (0.202) 
MinReturn 0.185 0.185 
(2.982) (2.953) 
R 2 0.418 0.509 
Adj. R 2 0.412 0.433 
Num. obs. 768 768 
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level 
(White), in parentheses.. 
no possible losses was also the one with the highest excess kurto- 
sis of 10.54. Volatility, by contrast, hardly seems to inﬂuence risk 
perception. This can be seen when contrasting assets NORMAL and 
WIDE, which are similar in terms of all other risk measures, but 
differ substantially in terms of standard deviation. A pairwise com- 
parison reveals these distributions’ average risk perception scores 
to be nearly identical at 4.19 (WIDE) and 4.28 (NORMAL). Further- 
more, while seven assets have almost identical standard deviations 
of around 18 percent, their perceived riskiness varies from 1.3 to 
5.9. 
In an additional analysis, shown in Table 2 , we use “perceived 
riskiness” as the explained and seven possible risk drivers (stan- 
dard deviation, semivariance, probability of a loss, expected loss, 
skewness, kurtosis, and minimum return) as the explanatory vari- 
ables in two regressions. We ﬁnd that only the coeﬃcient of the 
probability of a loss (PLoss) is signiﬁcant ( p < 0.01) and that kur- 
tosis shows no signiﬁcant effect, conﬁrming our individual correla- 
tion results, which highlighted “probability of a loss” as the main 
and only signiﬁcant factor driving perceived riskiness in our ex- 
periment. This is in line with, and thus successfully replicates, the 
ﬁndings of Zeisberger (2018) . Note again that loss aversion (as in 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 ) cannot explain the results, as shown 
in both Zeisberger (2018) and Holzmeister et al. (2019) . Their and 
our ﬁndings indicate that investors seem to care more about the 
loss likelihood rather than about the magnitude of losses. 
3.2. Market data 
After the individual risk assessment task, subjects trade in a 
continuous double auction market for three minutes in each pe- 
riod. Each asset was traded for one period in each of the 12 ses- 
sions, so we have a total of 12 average period prices per asset. We 
observe quite active trading, with an average of 24 transactions per 
market – one every 7.5 s. Average total trading volume per sub- 
ject is 6.092 assets (females 6.602 vs. males 5.489), and the average 
absolute net change in subjects’ asset balances is 2.984 (2.752 vs. 
3.259). We observe trading prices in the individual markets which 
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Fig. 2. Scatter plots and respective linear ﬁts of risk perception and seven risk measures. R 2 stems from linearly regressing average risk perception on the respective risk 
measure. 
mostly stay between 95 and 135 talers, with a few prices outside 
of these bounds. 8 
We ﬁrst present market-level data on risk perception, prices 
and trading volume. We then proceed to a lower aggregation level, 
analyzing how an individual’s risk perception and willingness to 
8 The only major outlier occurred in the ﬁrst period of session 7, in which the as- 
set NORMAL was traded. Here the average price was 253 talers and trading volume 
was comparatively low (14 trades). Given the magnitude of this exceptional outlier, 
combined with the fact that it occurred in the ﬁrst trading round and with low 
volume, we decided to discard it from the data analysis of prices, hence for asset 
NORMAL we have only 11 average period prices in all analyses, tables and ﬁgures. 
invest translates into actual actions in the market and how this af- 
fects prices. 
The ﬁrst and most prominent question we are interested in is 
whether market prices are inﬂuenced by investors’ average risk 
perception, or whether such perceptions are cancelled out in a 
market context. This could come about for example when the most 
active or sophisticated traders were to drive prices towards the 
fundamental value (identical across assets at 108). At the highest 
aggregation level, we compare average risk perception for an asset 
across all subjects with average prices across all sessions. 
As depicted in Fig. 3 , we see clearly that average risk perception 
drives prices, with higher perceived riskiness leading to markedly 
lower prices. The differences in average prices – ranging from 100 
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Fig. 3. Distribution of average prices over average risk perception. Aggregate data 
per asset, averaged over all markets. Each small circle represents one of the eight 
traded assets. 
to 119 – are considerable and, as shown later, statistically signiﬁ- 
cant. With an R 2 of 0.944, the relation between average risk per- 
ceptions and average trading prices is very strong. Given the risk- 
neutral BBV of about 108 for each asset, we ﬁnd average prices to 
deviate by roughly ±9 percent, depending on perceived riskiness. 9 
Note that the return distributions we show to subjects are 
based on proﬁts and losses relative to 100 and that the expected 
return is around 8 percent for each asset, leading to a risk-neutral 
price of 108 for each asset. At this price, however, asset NoLOSS 
can of course incur losses relative to the purchasing price. If, for 
example, a participant purchases the asset for 108 and the real- 
ized return is then 2 percent of the nominal BBV of 100, the sub- 
ject receives only 102. As we observe an average trading price of 
119 for asset NoLOSS, subjects purchasing this asset at this price 
should actually expect to incur losses in about 80 percent of all 
cases (as 80 percent of the possible realizations are below 19 per- 
cent return). However, we ﬁnd most subjects to be either ignorant 
of this fact or ready to accept the potential losses associated with 
the asset, thus keeping prices at the comparatively high levels we 
observe. Similar arguments hold for other assets. For example, as- 
set FrequentLOSS has a loss probability of zero if bought at prices 
below 95, as the largest loss for this asset is -5 percent. 
Table 3 shows OLS regressions of average and median prices, 
trading volume, and trading price volatility on average risk percep- 
tion and several other potentially relevant variables. Regarding our 
main outcome of interest, market prices (data columns 1 to 4), we 
ﬁnd that participants’ average risk perception in a market is the 
main driver of prices (average as well as median). If average risk 
perception is higher by 1, average prices are lower by 4.326, me- 
dian prices by 4.961. With a maximum difference in average risk 
perception of 3.979 between our assets, this accords to a maximum 
average price difference of 18.598 (21.584 for median prices), in 
line with our analysis above. Higher dispersion of risk perception 
between individuals within a market (as opposed to average risk 
perception) may conceivably also inﬂuence market prices, since it 
could be seen as a measure of market participant uncertainty. Yet 
9 Figure OA.4 in the appendix shows the same relationship with data from the 96 
individual markets. The four panels show results for the full dataset and for three 
robustness checks. 
we ﬁnd that the standard deviation 10 of subjects’ risk perception 
scores in a market does not correlate signiﬁcantly with average or 
median prices. Our results are also robust to controlling for aver- 
ages of ﬁnancial literacy, ﬁnancial risk tolerance, and loss aversion 
(data columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 ). Including these control variables 
increases R 2 only marginally for average and median prices. 
With regard to trading volume (data columns 5 and 6) our re- 
sults indicate no signiﬁcant joint variation with average risk per- 
ception or the dispersion of individuals’ risk perception scores 
within a market. For the latter, we ﬁnd a positive but insigniﬁ- 
cant coeﬃcient. Trading volume, however, depends on the gender 
composition and loss preferences. We ﬁnd lower trading volume 
in markets with higher proportions of men and with higher av- 
erage loss aversion of market participants. For trading volume, R 2 
increases from essentially zero to 0.296 when including the control 
variables, with average loss aversion and the proportion of female 
traders in a market as drivers. 
Turning to price volatility in a market (data columns 7 and 8) 
we do not ﬁnd any effects of average risk perception or its dis- 
persion. Volatility is only inﬂuenced by the proportion of female 
traders and average ﬁnancial literacy. A greater proportion of fe- 
male traders and higher average ﬁnancial literacy in a market cor- 
relate with lower volatility. 
The main takeaway from Table 3 is that prices are strongly in- 
ﬂuenced by average risk perception, with higher perceived riski- 
ness leading to lower prices. Risk perception dispersion does not 
inﬂuence market prices or trading volume, but gender and loss 
aversion do. Hence, in the contest of ideas of whether individual 
preferences and perceptions are washed out or inﬂuence prices, 
our results clearly support the latter position. 
3.3. Individual trading behavior and proﬁts 
When we turn to individual trading behavior in our markets, 
one key question is whether subjects’ ﬁnal asset holdings are 
driven by their respective risk perceptions, i.e., whether those 
traders within a market who perceive a given asset as being com- 
paratively more risky sell units of this asset to those traders who 
perceive it as being comparatively less risky. Table 4 shows that the 
data support this conjecture: ﬁnal asset holdings are highly signiﬁ- 
cantly negatively related to a trader’s perception of asset riskiness. 
Thus, risk perception clearly inﬂuences individual trading behavior 
in our markets. 
In the second data column of Table 4 we see that ﬁnancial lit- 
eracy, ﬁnancial risk tolerance, and ﬁnancial loss tolerance all show 
positive coeﬃcients, even though only ﬁnancial literacy’s is sig- 
niﬁcant. The last column reveals that women’s trades differ from 
men’s: female subjects are net sellers on average with 0.694 assets 
per period, while men purchase a net average of 0.822 assets ( p - 
value = 0.0 0 0; note that we had more female than male participants 
– 52 vs. 44, respectively). 
When we investigate this result in more detail, we ﬁnd evi- 
dence for a gender effect in trading behavior that does not disap- 
pear when controlling for risk perception (averages for females vs. 
males: 4.730 vs. 4.318; t(92 . 664) = 1 . 152 , p = 0 . 252 ), ﬁnancial lit- 
eracy score (3.962 vs. 4.500; t(93 . 242) = −2 . 161 , p = 0 . 033 ), ﬁnan- 
cial risk tolerance (2.385 vs. 5.159; t(84 . 16) = −5 . 594 , p = 0 . 0 0 0 ) 
or ﬁnancial loss aversion (4.558 vs. 5.545; t(93 . 978) = −1 . 939 , p = 
0 . 056 ). 
To properly analyze subjects’ proﬁts, we take each subject’s 
holdings of cash and assets at the end of each period. We then ag- 
gregate them to a variable PeriodEndWealth by valuing the ﬁnal as- 
set holdings with the asset’s expected ending value of around 108. 
10 Regressions using the range of risk perception scores in a market instead of the 
standard deviation yield essentially identical results. 
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Table 3 
OLS regressions of average and median prices as well as trading volume and price volatility on average risk perception, standard deviation of risk 
perception, and on market-level averages of subject characteristics. 
AvgPrice AvgPrice MedianPrice MedianPrice Volume Volume PriceSD PriceSD 
(Intercept) 121.916 ∗∗∗ 85.498 124.375 ∗∗∗ 97.373 24.155 ∗∗∗ 82.417 ∗ 12.744 ∗∗∗ 126.457 ∗∗∗
(9.299) (98.131) (9.979) (97.666) (4.738) (47.275) (4.013) (46.942) 
AvgRiskPerception −4 . 326 ∗∗ −3 . 835 ∗ −4 . 961 ∗∗ −4 . 510 ∗ −0.847 −1.119 −1.116 −1.346 
(1.812) (2.083) (2.007) (2.311) (0.929) (0.741) (0.930) (1.075) 
RiskPerception.SD 1.598 0.790 2.212 1.286 2.884 2.162 0.761 0.535 
(3.161) (2.837) (3.122) (2.790) (2.177) (2.187) (2.683) (2.695) 
PropFemale 5.309 7.466 21.135 ∗ −23 . 818 ∗∗
(27.128) (26.983) (12.302) (10.207) 
AvgFinLitScore −3.133 −3.897 −1.876 −15 . 756 ∗∗
(16.975) (16.576) (7.719) (6.936) 
AvgRiskFinancial 4.018 3.900 0.400 −3.502 
(2.966) (2.995) (3.321) (2.681) 
AvgLossAversion 5.866 4.610 −11 . 597 ∗∗∗ −3.884 
(9.139) (9.005) (2.140) (2.387) 
R 2 0.093 0.151 0.102 0.150 0.024 0.296 0.011 0.122 
Adj. R 2 0.073 0.093 0.083 0.092 0.002 0.248 −0.011 0.063 
Num. obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
RMSE 16.585 16.404 17.937 17.849 9.523 8.269 13.048 12.565 
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors, clustered at the session level, in parentheses. 
Table 4 
OLS regressions of ﬁnal asset holdings on RiskPerception and control variables . 
Final asset holdings Final asset holdings Final asset holdings 
Intercept 6.022 ∗∗∗ 3.899 ∗∗∗ 5.148 ∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.602) (0.662) 
RiskPerception −0 . 269 ∗∗∗ −0 . 235 ∗∗∗ −0 . 227 ∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.075) (0.074) 
FinLitScore 0.342 ∗∗∗ 0.313 ∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.109) 
FinancialRiskTolerance 0.109 ∗ −0.021 
(0.057) (0.064) 
FinancialLossTolerance 0.031 0.037 
(0.056) (0.055) 
Female −1 . 307 ∗∗∗
(0.303) 
R 2 0.016 0.044 0.067 
Adj. R 2 0.015 0.039 0.061 
Num. obs. 760 760 760 
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 5 
OLS regression of subjects’ period end wealth on subject risk and loss preferences (0 = very risk/loss averse, 10 = not at all risk/loss averse). 
PeriodEndWealth PeriodEndWealth PeriodEndWealth 
Intercept 1314.758 ∗∗∗ 1308.987 ∗∗∗ 1344.964 ∗∗∗
(16.006) (19.059) (18.985) 
FinLitScore 0.277 0.007 −0.133 
(1.645) (1.654) (1.635) 
FinancialRiskTolerance 7.421 ∗∗∗ 7.530 ∗∗∗ 3.262 
(2.845) (2.852) (2.644) 
FinancialLossTolerance −0.317 −0.352 −0.134 
(2.805) (2.793) (2.728) 
RiskPerception 1.495 1.790 
(1.912) (1.905) 
Female −41 . 431 ∗∗∗
(13.653) 
R 2 0.034 0.034 0.062 
Adj. R 2 0.030 0.029 0.056 
Num. obs. 760 760 760 
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, in parentheses. 
We use expected values to avoid distortions due to the ex-post re- 
alized random number, which remains unknown to our subjects 
while the market is open. Table 5 reports OLS regressions of sub- 
jects’ period end wealth on subject characteristics. The ﬁrst data 
column shows that ﬁnal wealth is higher with higher ﬁnancial risk 
tolerance, while ﬁnancial literacy and loss tolerance are no signif- 
icant drivers of ﬁnal wealth. The second column adds RiskPercep- 
tion, but this has no signiﬁcant effect and does not increase R 2 . The 
third column adds a dummy variable for gender, approximately 
doubling the adjusted R 2 , and documenting that women earn sig- 
niﬁcantly lower proﬁts. As our ﬁndings regarding women’s asset 
holdings already led us to expect, the main driver for women’s 
lower proﬁts is that they are net sellers of assets, especially of 
those assets that were most underpriced compared to the risk- 
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neutral BBV, i.e., the assets that were on average perceived to be 
the most risky. As a case in point, female subjects sell for an aver- 
age price of 103.88, while they buy for an average price of 110.64 
(measured over all markets and assets). 11 Hence, women on aver- 
age sell below and buy above the unconditional expected value of 
108. 
With regard to our short-selling constraint, we observe that in 
only 11.3 percent of all cases (86 out of 760 subject ×period com- 
binations) did a given subject own zero shares at the end of a pe- 
riod. Since it is unclear in how many cases subjects actually would 
have gone short, this can be considered an upper bound on the 
number of cases where the short-selling constraint could poten- 
tially have played a role. The evidence on risk-averse preferences 
among our subjects suggests that many subjects likely ended up 
owning zero shares because they aimed to minimize the risk in- 
herent in their ﬁnal wealth position, not because they wanted to 
counteract high asset prices by selling as many shares as (and 
more than) they owned. This is supported by the fact that the aver- 
age price across all assets was 107.36 and thus slightly below the 
unconditional expected buyback price of 108. We therefore con- 
clude that short-selling constraints are unlikely to have inﬂuenced 
our results. 
3.4. Robustness checks 
3.4.1. Outliers and trading time 
Our analyses are conducted with data from all markets and pe- 
riods (except for the single outlier mentioned in footnote 8 ). To test 
the robustness of our results, we re-run all analyses and tests with 
three alternative datasets, with the results shown in three ﬁgures 
in the internet appendix. 
In Robustness check I, learning from the outlier which hap- 
pened in the ﬁrst period of a market, we discard all data from the 
ﬁrst period, to allow for the possibility that subjects still need to 
learn to work in the market environment. We thus only analyze 
data from periods 2 to 8 (see Fig. OA.18 in the online appendix). 
Furthermore, it might take some time for prices to settle in a mar- 
ket in any given period. Therefore, in Robustness check II we only 
look at data from the ﬁnal 60 s of each of the 180 second-periods. 
This way we only look at prices once the market has more or less 
settled on an equilibrium for a period (see Figure OA.2 in the on- 
line appendix). Finally, in Robustness check III we combine the cri- 
teria from the ﬁrst two robustness checks. Hence, we take only 
data from periods 2 to 8 and we furthermore analyze only trans- 
actions which occurred in the ﬁnal 60 s of each period. We thus 
concentrate our analysis on the latest part of trading, where pos- 
sible noise and confusion should be lowest (see Fig. OA.3 in the 
online appendix). 
All three ﬁgures demonstrate that our results from the main 
analysis above also hold for each of the three robustness checks, 
as e.g. “probability of a loss” always has the highest R 2 . We con- 
clude that our general ﬁndings are robust to speciﬁc trading time 
and asset order. 
3.4.2. Salience of risk perception 
In addition to the robustness checks performed on the data 
from our main experiment, we also report on the results of three 
robustness check treatments. The ﬁrst consists of ﬁve sessions of 
classroom experiments testing the role of the pre-trade risk elic- 
itation on our results. In these ﬁve sessions, which we will refer 
to as treatment RETURN, instead of asking subjects “How risky do 
you perceive this security to be?” we ask “How attractive do you 
11 Male subjects buy for an average price of 101.95 and sell for an average price 
of 111.37, thus generating positive net trading proﬁts. 
perceive the returns of this security to be?”. The setup otherwise 
follows our main experiment in that each subject receives 5 assets 
and 800 cash at the beginning of each period, and one of the eight 
periods is randomly chosen to be relevant for payout. 
The results corroborate our ﬁndings from the main experi- 
ment: perceived attractiveness decreases in assets’ probability of 
loss ( R 2 = 0 . 94 at the asset level) and prices increase in perceived 
attractiveness ( R 2 = 0 . 60 ). Our results are thus not driven by our 
experimental setup directing subjects’ focus to asset risk. Rather, 
subjects endogenously focus on probability of loss whenever they 
scrutinize the displayed distributions. (See Appendix B for replica- 
tions of Figs. 2 and 3 for the data from treatment RETURN.) 
3.4.3. Trading experience 
In our next robustness check treatment, called treatment EXPE- 
RIENCE, instead of letting subjects trade each asset for one period 
only, we let subjects trade each asset for three consecutive peri- 
ods. We furthermore do not elicit subjects’ perceptions regarding 
the riskiness of the two assets in order not to direct subjects’ at- 
tention to this asset characteristic. Finally, we limit the set of assets 
to NoLOSS and FrequentLOSS, which in the main experiment were 
characterized by, respectively, the highest and lowest prices (and 
vice versa for perceived riskiness). In nine markets of eight traders 
each, subjects ﬁrst trade one asset for three periods, then trade the 
other for three periods (in ﬁve of the markets NoLOSS was traded 
ﬁrst, in the other four FrequentLOSS was). The setup again follows 
our main experiment in that each subject receives 5 assets and 800 
cash at the beginning of each period, and one of the six periods is 
randomly chosen to be relevant for payout. 
The results corroborate our ﬁndings from the main experi- 
ment and from treatment RETURN: prices are signiﬁcantly higher 
for NoLOSS than for FrequentLOSS in each of the three periods, 
with the difference not decreasing with repetition/experience (see 
Appendix C for detailed analyses). 
3.4.4. Parallel trading 
In our third robustness check treatment, TWO-MARKETS, we 
let participants trade two assets simultaneously to test whether 
and how portfolio choice plays a role in pricing the assets. In line 
with the main experiment, and in contrast to treatment EXPERI- 
ENCE, we elicit subjects’ perceptions regarding each asset’s riski- 
ness. Again we use only assets NoLOSS and FrequentLOSS for this 
treatment. As the task to trade two assets at the same time (on the 
same screen: one in the upper half of the screen, one in the lower; 
see Fig. OA.5 in the online appendix for a screenshot) causes a 
greater workload for traders, we extend the trading time from 3 to 
4 min. per period. To ensure enough liquidity we also increase the 
number of traders from 8 to 12 per market. We conduct ten mar- 
kets where subjects simultaneously trade the two assets for three 
consecutive periods. At the start of each period each subject is en- 
dowed with 5 units of each of the two assets and with 1600 cash. 
Again we ﬁnd patterns that are very similar to the ﬁndings from 
our main experiment and from treatment EXPERIENCE. 12 
We ﬁnd that risk perceptions differ signiﬁcantly between dis- 
tributions. The mean risk perception (on our scale of 1, or “not 
risky”, to 7, or “very risky”) over all subjects, periods and sessions 
for the NoLOSS asset is 1.67 while that for FrequentLOSS is 5.46 
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test V = 5514 . 5 , p = 0 . 0 0 0 0 ; paired t -test 
t(107) = 23 . 82 , p = 0 . 0 0 0 0 ). 
12 In one session we experience price outliers for asset NoLOSS, which was traded 
at an average price of 235.09 (while asset FrequentLOSS traded at an average price 
of 129.53). To be consistent with our outlier exclusion in the main experiment, we 
eliminate this session from our data. Our ﬁndings remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Results that include the data from this outlier session are presented in Appendix D . 
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We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference in the average prices the 
two assets are traded for. The mean period price over all peri- 
ods and sessions for the NoLOSS asset is 104.42 while that for 
FrequentLOSS is 97.08 (Wilcoxon signed ranks test V = 81 , p = 
0 . 01513 ; paired t -test t(25) = 2 . 336 , p = 0 . 0278 ). Turning to the 
three periods of trading each of the assets, average prices are 
108.59, 102.20 and 102.94 in periods 1 through 3 for asset 
NoLOSS, and 98.17, 95.79 and 97.40 for asset FrequentLOSS. (See 
Appendix D for further details.) 
Hence, with our robustness checks we show that our results are 
robust to analyzing only subsets of our data, to subjects’ experi- 
ence in trading the assets, to not cueing subjects to focus on risk 
perception prior to trading, and to individuals trading two assets 
simultaneously. We conclude that the results presented are robust 
and hold under several relevant conditions. 
4. Conclusion 
The question of how investors perceive risk is attracting in- 
creasing interest. The behavioral ﬁnance and decision making lit- 
erature provides evidence that perceived riskiness is more strongly 
driven by one-sided risk measures such as the probability of incur- 
ring a loss (e.g. Klos et al., 2005; Nosi ´c and Weber, 2010; Weber 
et al., 2013; Zeisberger, 2018 ) than by more “traditional” symmetric 
risk measures, such as the variance of returns. While these studies 
deliver valuable insights, they do not look beyond the individual 
investor-level in which decision-makers report self-stated risk per- 
ception, are price-takers and make a one-time investment decision. 
We are instead interested in how individual perceptions affect 
market prices and trading behavior in asset markets. When in- 
vestors use their orders to set prices on markets, individual beliefs, 
preferences and perceptions might cancel out or be diminished in 
the marketplace, and different risk-factors might drive asset prices. 
Or, on the contrary, these individual beliefs, preferences and per- 
ceptions may strongly inﬂuence and drive prices. Our paper is the 
ﬁrst to analyze how risk perception affects prices and trading be- 
havior in asset markets: we observed that average risk perception 
strongly inﬂuences asset prices. Furthermore, individual risk per- 
ception drives trading behavior and ﬁnal asset holdings in markets. 
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the probability of suffering a loss 
when investing in a given asset, relative to a nominal value, drive 
participants’ risk perception. This perception in turn drives mar- 
ket prices, as assets which are on average perceived as being 
more risky trade at lower prices. With a risk-neutral BBV of 108, 
our eight assets trade at average prices of between 100 and 119. 
With regard to individual trading behavior in markets we ﬁnd that 
traders who perceive an asset to be relatively more risky trade out 
of it, while those who perceive it to be relatively less risky are net 
buyers. This holds even as prices already reﬂect differences in aver- 
age risk perception. Consequently, asset prices and trading behav- 
ior in our experiments are driven by individual and average risk 
perception, and prices differ signiﬁcantly for assets characterized 
by the same mean and standard deviation. Our results are robust 
to analyzing different subsets of our data, and they also hold for 
experienced traders and when traders can trade two assets at the 
same time. 
Our ﬁndings differ from previously analyzed links between loss 
aversion and asset prices (see Ang et al., 2005 based on the dis- 
appointment aversion framework of Gul, 1991 or Barberis et al., 
2001 ) as in our case, results are driven by the probability of suffer- 
ing a loss. Loss aversion more generally is not capable of capturing 
our ﬁndings. In this way our results support – in a market setting 
– ﬁndings of Levy and Levy (2009) who test such preferences ex- 
perimentally but also show the theoretical implications for invest- 
ments and asset pricing. They show, for example, that preferences 
found in our study on the market and individual level can explain 
about one third of the equity premium puzzle. Also, such prefer- 
ences strongly inﬂuence asset pricing models, with investors hold- 
ing primarily safe assets. However, the heterogeneity in risk per- 
ceptions and preferences makes it diﬃcult to really infer market 
predictions from their results gained at the individual level, which 
is why we test these predictions in an experimental market setting. 
We believe that our results are of interest for investors, ﬁnan- 
cial professionals and regulators alike. With regard to risk char- 
acteristics, practitioners designing ﬁnancial products may well be 
aware that investors understand “risk” to a large extent as the 
probability of incurring a loss, and that issuers can thus demand a 
premium when offering a product with supposedly low risk by rul- 
ing out losses (real losses due to inﬂation do of course occur, but 
seem to be neglected by many investors). This explains why so- 
called “guarantee products” (promising to pay back at least the full 
investment amount, while offering the chance of earning a positive 
return if some benchmark performs well) are very popular among 
investors and issuers alike. 
Furthermore, our ﬁndings indicate that individual-level results 
regarding risk perception also affect market outcomes. When try- 
ing to better understand trading behavior and asset prices in ﬁ- 
nancial markets, risk measures besides those hitherto in the spot- 
light may be more important than previously acknowledged. Con- 
sequently, in order to better understand and possibly predict mar- 
ket outcomes, risk perception data – rather than classically used 
risk measures alone – provide potentially valuable additional ex- 
planatory power. Hence, we see value in putting more emphasis 
on understanding how investors experience and perceive invest- 
ment opportunities rather than on using more easily measurable 
objective risk metrics. One way to do so would be to use investor 
surveys and to also better tailor relevant questions to risk expecta- 
tions and perception. 
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Appendix A 
Fig. A.4. Scatter plots and respective linear ﬁts of risk perception on different risk measures. Each small circle represents one period. R 2 stems from linearly regressing 
average risk perception on the respective risk measure. 
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Fig. A.5. Robustness check: Scatter plots and respective linear ﬁts of risk perception on different risk measures, using only data from periods 2 through 8. Each small circle 
represents one period. R 2 stems from linearly regressing average risk perception on the respective risk measure. 
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Fig. A.6. Scatter plots and respective linear ﬁts of average price on different risk measures. Each small circle represents one period. R 2 stems from linearly regressing average 
price on the respective risk measure. 
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Appendix B. Results of robustness check treatment RETURN 
The following Fig. B.7 replicates Fig. 2 for the data from our RE- 
TURN treatment, and Fig. B.8 replicates Fig. 3 . Taken together they 
conﬁrm that an asset’s probability of a loss drives risk and attrac- 
tiveness perception, and that risk and attractiveness perception in 
turn drive market prices. 
Fig. B.7. Scatter plots and respective linear ﬁts of attractiveness perception and seven risk measures. Aggregate data per asset, averaged over all markets. Each small circle 
represents one of the eight traded assets. R 2 stems from linearly regressing average attractiveness perception on the respective risk measure. 
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Fig. B.8. Distribution of average prices over average attractiveness perception. Ag- 
gregate data per asset, averaged over all markets. Each small circle represents one 
of the eight traded assets. 
Appendix C. Results of robustness check treatment 
EXPERIENCE 
Table C.6 documents that the asset NoLOSS is traded at signif- 
icantly higher prices than asset FrequentLOSS and that this price 
difference does not vary across periods or with which asset is 
traded ﬁrst. 
Table C.6 
Regressions of AvgPrice (per period) on a dummy variable for the NoLOSS 
distribution, a period ID variable within the block of three periods of trad- 
ing the same asset, a dummy variable for the block being the second to be 
traded, and the interaction between the latter two variables. 
AvgPrice AvgPrice AvgPrice 
Intercept 95.313 ∗∗∗ 98.665 ∗∗∗ 98.163 ∗∗∗
(1.974) (3.950) (5.520) 
NoLOSS 9.457 ∗∗∗ 9.457 ∗∗∗ 9.221 ∗∗∗
(2.792) (2.793) (2.845) 
Period in block −1.676 −0.836 
(1.711) (2.448) 
Second block 1.240 
(7.486) 
Period in block × Second block −1.681 
(3.462) 
R 2 0.181 0.196 0.209 
Adj. R 2 0.165 0.164 0.144 
Num. obs. 54 54 54 
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Appendix D. Results of robustness check treatment 
TWO-MARKETS 
We start by providing further details on our ﬁndings from the 
TWO-MARKETS treatment by presenting a ﬁgure and regressions 
based on the data excluding the outlier session. Fig. D.9 compares 
average period prices to average risk perception. Each circle repre- 
sents one trading period. The slightly downward sloping line stems 
from a linear ﬁt of the data. Prices decrease in risk aversion. 
Table D.7 
OLS and session ﬁxed effects panel regressions of average prices across as- 
sets. Standard errors clustered at the session level, in parentheses. 
AvgPrice (OLS) AvgPrice (FE) 
Intercept 97.789 ∗∗∗
(7.354) 
NoLOSS 12.249 ∗∗ 12.249 ∗∗∗
(4.946) (4.524) 
Period −0.347 −0.554 
(1.817) (1.529) 
NoLOSS × Period −2.406 −2.406 
(1.717) (1.570) 
R 2 0.091 0.328 
Adj. R 2 0.034 0.143 
Num. obs. 52 52 
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table D.7 documents that the asset NoLOSS is priced signiﬁ- 
cantly more highly than asset FrequentLOSS and that this price dif- 
ference does not vary across periods. 
If we include the outlier session in our data analysis, we ﬁnd 
the following: The mean risk perception (on our scale of 1, or “not 
risky”, to 7, or “very risky”) over all subjects, periods and sessions 
for the NoLOSS asset is 1.65 (instead of 1.67) while that for Fre- 
quentLOSS is 5.48 (instead of 5.46) (Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
V = 6847 . 5 , p = 0 . 0 0 0 0 , paired t -test t(119) = 26 . 073 , p = 0 . 0 0 0 0 ). 
The mean period price over all periods and sessions for the 
NoLOSS asset is 117.80 (instead of 104.42) while that for Fre- 
quentLOSS is 100.45 (instead of 97.08) (Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test V = 95 , p = 0 . 0069 , paired t -test t(28) = 1 . 9087 , p = 0 . 0 6 6 6 ). 
Turning to the three periods of trading each of the assets, aver- 
age prices are 118.24, 117.44 and 117.76 instead of (108.59, 102.20, 
102.94) in periods 1 through 3 for the asset NoLOSS, and 102.03, 
99.82 and 99.65 instead of (98.17, 95.79, 97.40) for the asset 
FrequentLOSS. 
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Fig. D.9. Prices vs. average risk perception across all periods. Top left: full data. Top right: data from the last 60 s of trading in each period. Bottom left: data from the last 
trading period in each session only. Bottom right: data from the last 60 s in the last trading period in each session only. 
Supplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be 
found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2019.105635 . 
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